This paper analyzes the employment behavior of home multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Europe. To this end we use a unique firm level panel data set of more than 1,000 European multinational parent enterprises and their affiliates. The affiliates are located either in the European Union (North, South), Central and Eastern Europe or both.
Introduction
The opening up of Central and Eastern Europe posed a profound economic challenge for the European Union (EU). Virtually overnight EU countries were confronted with a group of neighboring countries with structurally very different economic conditions. Not only was the economic system of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) built on nearly 50 years of centrally based planning. Even more importantly from the EU's perspective was the huge gap in income, wages and productivity between the two regions. The demise of the Communist legacy represented an abrupt shock, especially when compared to the gradual process that characterizes post-war West European integration. Most of the policy concerns relate to employment, because Eastern Europe represents a large reservoir of low wage labor in the EU's backyard. In light of the above, one concern is that low wage import competition from the CEECs may result in job losses in EU member states. Alternatively, EU companies may just move some of their operations to the CEEC. One of the most obvious channels through which home (EU) jobs may be affected by this increased economic integration is through the employment (re)-allocation decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is often argued that MNEs are footloose (Caves, 1996; Görg and Strobl, 2002) . They operate over a range of diverse national markets and can reallocate their factors of production across these markets to minimize total costs of production. The assumption being that they can respond to changing local economic conditions, without having to incur major set up costs.
In this paper we study the effect of foreign wages 1 on the demand for labor by EU MNEs.
We use firm level data of 1,067 medium and large sized parent MNEs matched with their 2,078
affiliates located in the EU and/or Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we can analyze how labor demand in parent and affiliate enterprises is associated with changes in affiliate wages 2 relative to parent wages. We define a parent as a firm located in country i holding a direct ownership share of at least 50% in one or more firms located in another country j L DQG UHIHU WR these firms as affiliates. Thus we only consider this direct relationship and do not consider indirect holding structures. The fact that we have a panel of matched parent firms with their affiliates allows us to control for firm specific technology that may affect labor allocation across different regions. This enables us to focus on the employment substitution effects between parent firms (or home parent employment) and their affiliates. Substitution effects may exist in response to changing wage conditions in different countries, while at the same time keeping as a given global output that the MNE seeks to produce. This paper is not about the actual investment decision and its impact on employment in MNEs, rather we take locations as given. What we consider is how MNEs reshuffle jobs between the parent and their affiliates in response to wage differentials that may exist between these operations. Our data do not provide any information on the actual timing of the investment decision, so that we cannot evaluate the effects on employment in response to the actual investment/location decision. Of course relative wage costs in various countries may play a role in the location decision of a MNE, which may have implications for employment responses. However, strategic reasons related to market penetration and market expansion are often found as the main driving forces for foreign direct investment, rather than labor cost differentials (e.g. Lankes and Venables, 1996, Abraham and Konings, 1 Wages refer to total labor costs including social security contribution and payroll tax. 2 A related literature is concerned with outsourcing by multinational firms in reducing demand for unskilled labor in the home country (e.g. Slaughter, 2000; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) . However, we have no information on the skill 1999). Braconier and Ekholm (2001) Likewise, Bruno and Falzoni (2000) find strong employment relocation effects between US parent firms and their affiliates in developing countries. Interestingly, Hatzius (1998) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) use Swedish firm level panel data, collected through surveys, and find that employment relocation is taking place between the Swedish headquarters and their affiliates in other high-income locations.
composition of the workers in our firm level data, so we are not able to focus on these type of demand shifts.
While this paper is not directly testing various theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) it is worth mentioning -as a background -the distinction that is made in the literature between horizontal and vertical FDI because this is also related to labor cost differentials in different locations. The approach of vertical FDI says that the MNE locates in a particular place to take advantage of international factor-price differences (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) . Parent headquarters engage in more capital-intensive activities, while production is labor intensive and is outsourced to the low-wage locations. The horizontal FDI view asserts that MNE investment arises because trade barriers increase the costs of exporting. FDI in this view takes place primarily for market expansion reasons (e.g. Markusen, 1995; Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000) .
Empirical work has provided evidence supporting the horizontal view of FDI, assisted by the fact that a significant proportion of FDI flowed between rich countries (e.g. Markusen, 1995 , Lipsey, 1999 , Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001 Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
(i) We find supporting evidence for employment relocation effects between parent home employment and affiliate foreign employment. This relocation effect depends on the activity in which the parent MNE is operating.
(ii) For MNE parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector we find that, contrary to the popular belief, employment relocation occurs mainly between home parent firms and their North-EU based affiliates. Employment relocation does not occur on average from parent firms to either South-EU or Central and East European based affiliates.
(iii) Additionally, we also find that the substitution effects are stronger when the sector of activity of the parent firm is different than the sector of activity of the affiliates.
(iv) In contrast, for parent firms operating in the non-manufacturing sector we find no evidence of relocation effects.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we have a first look at the data that we use. Section 3 sets up the econometric framework and reports the main results. Section 4 reports some robustness checks, while section 5 gives the conclusion.
Data and Preliminary Facts
We make use of a commercial database of company accounts, comparable to other Statements of medium and large sized companies in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe (see also data appendix). In most European countries medium and large sized enterprises are required by law to submit company accounts to their Central Bank or National Statistical Offices.
All these company accounts went through a formal external auditing process, so we have no reasons to believe that the reported information in the Balance Sheet and Income and Loss
Statement is incorrect.
Apart from the standard data provided in company accounts, the data also includes information on the ownership structure of firms. The company records include information on whether the company has an ownership stake in a foreign affiliate, and identify affiliates by name and an identification number. For some countries (e.g. Belgium) companies are required by law to report their affiliates, while for some other countries (e.g. the Netherlands) companies can voluntarily choose whether or not to report their affiliates.
Financial and operational information is available for 1993 through 1998, and we retrieved all companies for which unconsolidated accounts were available separately for the parent and its affiliates. Due to variation in national reporting requirements, all companies in some countries-in particular Greece and Finland-lack basic information (e.g., wage bills) that are essential for our analysis. Otherwise, we include companies in the data set simply on the basis of data availability and the ability to link parents with foreign affiliates. Companies in all industries are included, with primary industry for each parent and affiliate reported at the twodigit level of the NACE system.
The available ownership information refers to the year 1998, and we assume that the parent-affiliate ownership structure for 1998 applies to the earlier years. While we cannot trace ownership changes during the sample period, we do not believe that this is a serious problem. To the extent that we are potentially including a few affiliates who were not affiliated in earlier years, we are introducing measurement error that may bias our results towards zero.
Our eventual data set covers the period 1993-98 and is an unbalanced panel of 1,067 parent companies located in the EU, with 2,078 affiliates located in the EU or Central and Eastern Europe or both 5 . We only take into account direct ownership links 6 and furthermore there is no affiliate that also appears as a parent in our data set. Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of parent firms and their affiliates across the various European countries. Germany, France and
Belgium host almost 60% of the parent firms in our sample. France, Italy, Spain and the UK contain many of the affiliates in our sample, with only 5.34% located in Central and Eastern Europe. wage cost differentials is important. This is because the main activity of the foreign affiliate is related to distribution rather than production within the multinational group.
Turning to the non-manufacturing parent firms we note that (58.47%) of them control affiliates only in the non-manufacturing sectors, with a substantial fraction (24.66%) having affiliates in manufacturing only. This latter fraction could reflect that the production is 'outsourced' to the affiliates, while the 'administration' is done in the home parent firm. Our analysis will exploit some of these dimensions.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the evolution of total affiliate employment as a fraction of total MNE employment, i.e. the sum of total affiliate and parent employment. Figure 1 shows us that the employment share of parent MNEs has declined from 85% to 72% between 1993 and 1998, while the employment share of its affiliates has steadily increased from 15% to 28% in this period. This suggests that some reshuffling of jobs between parent firms and their affiliates took place in this relatively short time period. Figures 2 and 3 shed some more light on this reshuffling. Looking at figure 2 we note that it is especially the affiliates located in the EU that have gained in relative employment, while the employment shares of the affiliates in CEEC remained relatively stable.
Finally, figure 3 makes an additional distinction between affiliates located in 'South' Europe and 'North' Europe. We defined the 'South' of Europe as the low wage countries in the EU, i.e.
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland. We can see that the increased fraction of affiliate EU employment is mainly driven by an increased fraction of employment in affiliates located in the 'North' of Europe. These patterns suggest that most of the job relocation took place between EU parent firms and their affiliates located in the 'North' of Europe. We will test this hypothesis in a more rigorous framework in section 3. Table 4 shows summary statistics on the data that we are using. We proxy output by the total value added of the MNE using a weighted sum of the value added of the parent and of its affiliates. As we can see from table 4, parent companies in our sample employ on average 1,873
persons, while their affiliates employ less workers on average. The typical EU affiliate employs 243 workers on average, while the typical affiliate in CEEC employs almost twice as many workers, 460. This is not surprising since unit labor costs are much lower in the latter region. The world.
average labor cost per worker per year is $ 52,000 in parent firms, while this is only $7,000 in the typical affiliate in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the labor cost in Central and Eastern
Europe is much lower than in Europe, also the average labor productivity is much lower. In our sample value added per worker in the 'North' EU is $83,000 and is $81,000 in the 'South' EU, but only $22,000 in the Central and Eastern Europe region on average.
Econometric Framework and Results

Econometric Specification
Consider a MNE that produces global output, Y, using the following production function, which depends only on labor input in the various locations. We expect the following partial derivatives:
• The own wage to be negatively related to home parent labor demand;
• If there are substitution effects between parent and affiliate employment;
A l > 0, with l= NEU, SEU, CEEC.
• If there are no substitution effects between parent and affiliate employment;
A l , with l= NEU, SEU, CEEC.
The substitution effect or employment relocation effect gives an indication of the technological substitution possibilities between parent and affiliate employment, for a given production of a global output level. It represents the technological possibilities to move along the same isoquant.
Equation (2) will form the basis of our empirical specifications. In particular we will estimate (2) by assuming a log-linear approximation or . Furthermore we include in (3) year dummies to control for unobserved aggregate shocks, which are common to all parent firms. The above framework does not take into account potential employment adjustment costs in response to shocks, which would imply a dynamic specification. To theoretically model adjustment costs for multinational enterprises is not straightforward as these costs may be different for the parent company and its affiliates, depending on the local institutional constraints.
Studies that assume symmetric quadratic costs of adjustment suggest that the speed of adjustment varies in different countries. For instance Anderson (1993) finds for American retail establishments that most of the adjustment is completed in one quarter. Likewise, Mairesse and Dormont (1985) find that for American manufacturing firms nearly five-sixths of the response is completed within a year, while for French and German manufacturing firms they find a very slow adjustment. Also Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) find for British manufacturing firms that only 20 percent of the adjustment to a shock is made up in one year. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) suggest the assumption of symmetric quadratic adjustment costs is one of the reasons to find differences in the speed of adjustment and suggest some alternatives. It is not our purpose to model such an adjustment process for the allocation decision of employment for MNEs.
Information on the opening and closing of affiliates is likely to be important for this, however this is not given in our data. Instead we will conduct a number of robustness checks by estimating a simple dynamic employment equation, without deriving this theoretically. Table 5 shows firm level fixed effects estimates for equation (3). Column (1) gives the results for the overall sample, while columns (2) and (3) for parent firms operating in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing respectively. The first point worth noting is that the own wage elasticity (i.e. the effect of W P ) is estimated at -0.89, this is well within the range of estimated labor demand elasticities reported in the literature (e.g. Hamermesh, 1993 Brainard (1997) . Brainard shows that it is more likely that substitution between parent and affiliate employment takes place in response to wage cost differentials when the proximity to the final market is important. In this case transport or trade costs are assumed to be negligible. Such substitution effects are also more likely when the initial factor endowments are similar across locations. This is the case for North European affiliate and (mostly North EU based) parent firms in our sample.
Results
In the second and third column of table 5 we report results for the sub-samples of parent companies operating in the manufacturing versus the non-manufacturing sector. We can see that the relocation effect, estimated by the coefficient on W NEU , is driven mainly by the sub-sample of parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector. From column (2) we note that this estimated firm level fixed effect.
effect is now twice as high, at 0.032, compared to the estimate based on the whole sample in column (1). Moreover, we find no statistically significant substitution elasticities for our subsample of parent firms operating in the non-manufacturing sector as shown in column (3). One potential reason why we find no substitution effects in the non-manufacturing sector could be due to the nature of these activities, in that it is believed that there are more non-tradables in nonmanufacturing.
In table 6 we report some robustness checks. As discussed earlier it is well known that adjustment costs in employment are potentially important, which may imply a dynamic employment specification. In table 6 we report a simple dynamic model in which we include the lagged dependent variable. The introduction of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects model introduces an endogeneity bias. We therefore estimated this model in first differences to control for the unobserved firm level fixed effects and applied the Arellano and Bond (1991) IV GMM estimator. This means that we used all available moment restrictions on employment dated from t-2 and before. Furthermore, we also instrumented output using all available moment restrictions from t-2 and before. Additional instruments included parent country dummies, which may capture institutional differences such as minimum wage laws, employment protection legislation, etc. between countries. The Sargan test (Chi-2 distribution) and the second order serial correlation test (Normal distribution) suggest that the instruments and model specification are valid. Our basic results remain robust. We find that the parent own short and long run wage elasticity is estimated at -0.65 and -1.0 respectively, while the short and long run substitution elasticity between parent employment and North EU affiliate employment is estimated 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. Thus, as before employment relocation seems to take place, but only between North EU parent employment and North EU affiliate employment. Again, this result is driven by the substitution possibilities in the manufacturing sector, where estimated short and long run elasticity of substitution is 0.06 and 0.08 respectively.
One of the empirical regularities characterizing MNEs is that they mostly operate in sectors that are R&D intensive and are often characterized by high levels of intangible assets, which is often reflected in the skill composition of their workforce (Markusen, 1995) . The data that we use have no information on the skill composition of the workforce, so we treated labor as homogeneous. Slaughter (2000) has shown for the US, that this may not be too much of a problem. He finds that MNE transfer to low wage countries has occurred, however, he finds no evidence that this has contributed to shifts in the relative demand for fewer unskilled workers in the US. As an extra robustness check we include as extra controls in our equation proxies for R&D intensity at the parent firm. As a proxy for R&D we use intangible assets as a percentage of total assets in the parent firm. A second control variable that we include is capital, proxied by the book value of tangible fixed assets. Our results, reported in table A1 of the appendix, remained robust to the inclusion of these extra controls.
The previous results did not make any distinction between affiliates that are operating in the same sector as their parent versus affiliates that are operating in a different sector as their parents. However, many of the affiliates of manufacturing parents are operating in the 'wholesale'
and 'retail' trade sector. Arguably, these affiliates have as their main function selling and distribution activities aimed at market expansion. In these cases it seems unlikely that employment substitution based on labor cost differentials takes place. In table 7 we report fixed effects estimates of manufacturing parents with affiliates operating in the same 2-digit sector, affiliates operating in a different 2-digit sector and finally, in column 3, affiliates operating in a different 2-digit sector, but excluding the wholesale and trade sectors. We find that employment substitution between parents and their affiliates takes place, but only if they are operating in a different sector. Moreover, the substitution elasticity increases when we exclude the wholesale and retail trade sectors and is equal to 0.08 (column 3). This suggests that a reduction in labor costs in the North EU affiliates of 10% is associated with a reduction in home (parent) employment of about 1%, which is quite substantial. These results hold up if we consider a dynamic specification and use instrumental variables, not reported here for brevity.
A final experiment, reported in the appendix table A2, considers employment equations of affiliates in the various regions. Again our main result is confirmed. There is only evidence of substitution effects between North EU affiliate employment and parent employment.
Furthermore, table A2 shows also that there is no substitution taking place between the different affiliates. In contrast, we find that for affiliates located in the South EU, the wage cost of CEEC affiliates of the same MNE have a negative effect on South EU employment, which suggests that CEEC employment and South EU employment are complements.
In summary, our results indicate that competition from low wage locations does not contribute significantly to employment relocation from home (parent) firms to their affiliates in these low wage locations. Since we have no information on the actual opening up of affiliates we could not investigate whether the actual investment is associated with job loss and therefore the results in this paper need to be interpreted as short run employment relocation between parents and their affiliates.
Conclusions
This paper used a large representative panel data set of more than 1000 EU MNEs and their affiliates located in the EU and CEEC to test whether parent jobs are substituted for by foreign ones. We find evidence supporting the presence of substitution effects between parent employment and foreign employment, however, contrary to the popular belief we find that employment relocation mainly takes place between (mainly Northern EU based) parent companies and their affiliates located also in the North of the EU, rather than their affiliates located in the South of the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, this effect is mainly present in the manufacturing sector and amplified in affiliates that are operating in a different sector than their parent.
For parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector we find employment substitution elasticities ranging between 0.03 and 1.0. This potentially can cause large flows of employment if labor costs in different regions change, perhaps due to institutional changes affecting labor costs, such as changes in employer contributions. Our findings are consistent with the proximity hypothesis discussed in the literature. The results in this paper suggest that on average the opening of CEEC should not be viewed as a threat to European employment. It is rather competition between EU countries that lead multinational parent firms to relocate employment between EU locations. This paper has not, however, investigated the employment impact of the actual investment/location decision of MNEs due to data limitations. Further research on this latter issue seems to be important to assess the full impact of the increased global nature of firms. (ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance.
(iii) Robust standard errors in brackets. (ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance.
(iii) Robust one step standard errors in brackets.
(iv) The lagged dependent variable and total output are instrumented using all available moment restrictions. Parent country dummies are included as additional instruments. R&D intensity: intangible assets as a percentage of total assets in the parent firm.
Capital: the book value of tangible fixed assets.
Central and East European Countries (CEECs):
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic (Note that data for Hungary are not available from Amadeus). (ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance.
(iii) Robust standard errors in brackets.
